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A BRIEF HISTORY
In order to answer those questions, we must first recognize
how unusual the prior structure of U.S. commercial banking
was in comparison with other countries’ banking systems.
Commercial banking began in the United States, as in most
other countries, as an instrument of state intervention and eco-
nomic planning. Banks were chartered in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries to accomplish government-
sanctioned purposes. The scarcity of such charters created
monopoly rent for banks, which acted as an implicit tax-and-
transfer scheme that supported the activities in which the
favored banks engaged. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, in most states, that
mercantilist approach was replaced by one of “free” bank char-
tering. But banks were still subject to special taxes or required
to hold government paper as part of their extensive regulato-
ry mandate.
State regulation One key feature of the U.S. system was that
state laws largely determined bank regulation. States were free
to establish barriers to entry in banking that limited new
entrants from competing with existing banks. Not only was
interstate banking forbidden, but, in most states until the 1980s,
competition within states was also circumscribed by regula-
tions that limited branching or consolidation. Despite the Con-
stitution’s clear mandate to ensure unfettered interstate com-
merce, the Supreme Court did not interpret interstate banking
barriers as barriers to commerce. That opened the way for local
special interest groups (including both bankers and some bank
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he past two decades have seen a
radical transformation of regulations con-
trolling the size, location, and activities of
U.S. banks. Included in those changes are
state-level reforms of branching barriers,
relaxation of deposit interest rate ceilings,
the passage of a nationwide bank-branch-
ing law in 1994, and the expansion of bank powers through-
out the 1980s and 1990s. The reforms culminated in the pas-
sage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which established
financial holding companies — an alternative to more limit-
ed bank holding companies — as a platform for building the
global, universal U.S. banks of the next generation. 
Prior to the sea change of the past two decades, banks most-
ly focused narrowly on deposit taking and lending in separate
local markets. Now, U.S. banks operate on an unprecedented
large scale throughout the country and the world, and are able
to marry traditional lending and deposit-taking activities with
investment banking, private equity investing, asset manage-
ment, insurance, and many other financial services. What
caused the drastic changes? What barriers to efficient financial
intermediation still remain? And what have we learned from the
recent experience about the next wave of innovation and dereg-
ulation in the financial services industry?
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borrowers) to lobby for branching restrictions. The limits on
branching produced a system of thousands of banks, which
reached nearly 30,000 by 1921. 
Consequences The geographic fragmentation and nar-
rowly circumscribed powers of American banks made the U.S.
system inferior in several respects. It limited diversification of
loan risks and diversification of income from mixing differ-
ent banking services. Small, undiversified banks tended to be
riskier, leading to greater instability during economic down-
turns. Small, rural banks were most vulnerable, and they
responded by lobbying for deposit insurance — at both the
state and national levels — as a means to protect themselves
at the expense of taxpayers and large banks (which bore a dis-
proportional share of the costs of mutual deposit insurance).
The perverse incentives of state-level deposit insurance sys-
tems enacted before World War I produced banking collaps-
es in several states in the 1920s, which added further to the
costs from unit banking. 
Unit banking also created a mismatch between the small
scale of banks and the growing scale of industrial enterprises,
which increasingly came to operate regional or nationwide
networks of production and distribution during the second
industrial revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The mismatch made it increasingly difficult for banks
to finance industrial activity, either as lenders or as under-
writers of securities, and thus made the cost of industrial
finance unnecessarily high. 
Finally, unit banking made agricultural finance more cost-
ly by limiting the development of regional or national mar-
kets for bankers’ acceptances to finance the movement of
crops (an instrument that was prevalent in other countries).
Bankers’ acceptances worked best in the context of nation-
wide branch banking, where banks could finance crop move-
ments through the clearing of balances across regions with-
in the same bank.
The Depression In the wake of the agricultural banking busts
of the 1920s, those flaws became increasingly apparent to crit-
ics of the American bank regulatory system. The recognition
of the bank fragility produced by entry barriers underlay a
widespread and successful movement to permit branching and
consolidation within and across states, and to repeal deposit
insurance. As banks grew in size, they also found it beneficial
to increase industrial lending and develop additional services
for industrial borrowers, including the underwriting of secu-
rities offerings. But the Great Depression cut that initial wave
of bank deregulation short. 
The Depression accentuated the weakness of many small
banks that were already distressed. Bank distress during the
Depression is a complex subject. Recent empirical research by
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the Great Depression), the 1930s bank failures — like those of
the 1920s — were regional phenomena that mirrored deteri-
orating local economic fundamentals. In early 1933, sudden,
economy-wide deposit withdrawals — produced in part by
anticipation of President Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to aban-
don the gold standard — led to a nationwide “bank holiday.”
But before 1933, bank failures varied across regions in severi-
ty and timing, and were predictable results of changes in local
economic activity. Local runs on banks (much less nationwide
runs on banks) were not important contributors to bank dis-
tress prior to early 1933. 
From the standpoint of economic reasoning, the Great
Depression reinforced the logic of bank deregulation by show-
ing the vulnerability of a geographically fragmented and undi-
versified banking system. Moreover, as Eugene White has
shown, the Depression years also revealed an advantage from
universal banking: Banks that engaged in securities under-
writing during the 1920s benefited from greater income diver-
sification and were less likely to fail during the Depression.
Backlash But the effect of the Depression on the political
economy of bank regulation was to reverse the process of
deregulation and the removal of entry barriers. Populist sena-
tors and congressmen defended small banks and portrayed
them as victims of rapacious large banks, which they accused
of dishonest practices and blamed for causing the Depression.
The mixing of commercial and investment banking was par-
ticularly vilified as creating conflicts of interest within banks
that combined underwriting and lending. 
Recent historical studies by Randall Kroszner and Raghuram
Rajan, and by George Benston, have refuted congressional alle-
gations that universal banking promoted conflicts of interest. But
those studies were produced too late to prevent the regulatory
backlash caused by congressional accusations of impropriety.
The historic 1933 Banking Act was a classic logrolling compro-
mise through which populist supporters of small, rural banks,
like Rep. Henry Steagall, won federal deposit insurance in
exchange for limiting the investment banking activities of com-
mercial banks (a favorite hobby horse of the sincere but mis-
guided Sen. Carter Glass). 
From the standpoint of the industry and the public, feder-
al deposit insurance and limits on commercial banks was a
“lose-lose” compromise. From the standpoint of Congress, it
was the usual “win-win.”
WHY DEREGULATION AFTER 1980?
From the perspective of this thumbnail historical sketch of U.S.
banking history, one might argue that the most remarkable
aspect of the post-1980 bank deregulation is that it was so
delayed. Why did it take so long to correct the regulatory mis-
takes that were exacerbated by the Great Depression? What
finally led the government to permit banks to diversify region-
ally and branch out in products as well as locations?
Interestingly, the process of reform in the 1980s was some-
what similar to the earlier experience of the 1920s. In both eras,
bank distress was an important spur to change, as it created
local demands for new inflows of bank credit to replace failed
or shrinking banks. That led to the relaxation of branching
restrictions, first at the state level, then regionally and nation-
ally. And fortunately, there was no Great Depression shock to
interrupt the new process of rationalization and reform.
An additional important influence on post-
1980 deregulation was the growing competition that Amer-
ican banks faced, both domestically from securities markets
and non-bank intermediaries (e.g., finance companies) and
internationally from other countries’ banks as opportunities
for international competition expanded. The constraining
influence of American regulation became recognized both as
a cause of foreign bank entry into U.S. markets and a barri-
er to the expansion of U.S. banks abroad. Technological
changes in communications and information technology that
facilitated the development of securities markets and inter-
national capital flows played a role here, because they per-
mitted new entrants to compete more easily with U.S. banks
and thus drove reluctant politicians to act. (See “The Moti-
vations Behind Banking Reform,” Summer 2001.)
Regulation Q Another influence on competitive pressures
facing banks was the high inflation environment of the late
1960s and 1970s. High inflation reduced the attractiveness of
bank deposits, whose interest rates were subject to “Regulation
Q” ceilings. Regulation Q — another provision of the 1933 Act
— was intended in part to limit competition within banking,
and thereby strengthen banks. Its other purpose was to dis-
courage commercial bank financing of stock market transac-
tions through the call loan market. In the 1930s, Sen. Glass
opposed the “pyramiding” of reserves — interbank transfers
of deposits to New York banks during times of low loan
demand in the periphery — because he believed that the prac-
tice made banks too vulnerable to stock market cycles. Regu-
lation Q was intended to cure the alleged malady. 
The most important effect of Regulation Q was to limit
banks’ ability to compete with non-bank sources of finance in
the 1960s and 1970s. High inflation eroded the return that
savers could earn on low-interest deposits, and thus encour-
aged alternative intermediaries (e.g., credit unions and finance
companies) and alternative instruments to deposits, the most
important of which was commercial paper. The commercial
paper market grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, and became
an important alternative to bank loans for high-quality cor-
porate issuers. Just as importantly, commercial paper was the
primary means of financing the growth of finance companies,
which became important competitors in both commercial and
consumer lending. 
Institutional investors High and uncertain inflation also
pointed to the advantages of equity investments over debt in
household portfolios, and that encouraged the growth of
equity as an alternative to debt in corporate finance. The
move to equities received assistance from the establishment
of new equity-holding intermediaries — pension funds and
mutual funds — that, as wholesale purchasers of stock offer-
ings, substantially reduced the physical and informational
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costs of placing equity. The new “institutional investors” also
funded pioneering efforts in the development of venture cap-
ital intermediaries, which transformed the financing options
of growing young firms in new industries. The growth of
institutional investors was encouraged by tax incentives for
employee pensions and the decreasing attractiveness of fixed-
income instruments. 
The need for change All of those changes in intermediation
technology became important in the 1960s and 1970s, and
served to undermine the dominant position of depository insti-
tutions as repositories of savings and sources of funding.
Because the banks’ new competitors were outside the purview
of U.S. bank regulation, the regulators were faced with the
choice of either overseeing the shrinkage of the U.S. banking
industry or fostering its efficient transformation through dereg-
ulation. The Federal Reserve played an important role in
advancing deregulation by relaxing barriers on bank activities
(to the extent allowed by law) and advocating the need for more
sweeping changes to preserve the competitive position of
American banks.
Deposit insurance In addition to the relaxation of interest rate
ceilings, the elimination of entry barriers, and the expansion
of bank activities, the 1980s and 1990s saw important changes
to federal deposit insurance. The reforms included the estab-
lishment of minimum capital standards and the creation of a
set of rules, collectively known as “prompt corrective action,”
that, in principle, should result in the closure of undercapital-
ized or insolvent banks before they produce large losses for the
insurance fund. 
The reforms attempt to prevent deposit insurance from
subsidizing (and thus encouraging) greater risk-taking by
banks. Here, the spurs to change were the costly and politically
embarrassing activities of risk-taking thrifts and banks dur-
ing the 1980s. The firrea Act of 1989 and the fdicia Act
of 1991 — although unsatisfactory in important respects —
represented a relatively rapid response (by congressional stan-
dards) to the thrift and banking crises of the 1980s. As with
the Banking Act of 1933, Congress acted because the political
costs of failing to address perceived regulatory flaws became
significantly large. 
BANKING AFTER THE REGULATORY CHANGES
The regulatory changes of the 1980s and 1990s are reflected
in a fundamental transformation within the banking indus-
try. The industry now consists of a complex structure of hold-
ing company subsidiaries that perform a variety of financial
transactions. 
Size The size distribution of banks has taken on a “barbell”
shape, with giant nationwide banks and small local banks, but
few in between. The consolidation wave of the 1980s and 1990s
saw middling-size banks absorbed by nationwide or “super-
regional” powerhouses. There is a clear link between size and
scope driving scale economies in universal banking. Only larg-
er banks that operate vast networks, which can spread over-
head costs over many clients and assets, can expand into the
full range of products and services needed to enhance the value
of bank-client relationships. Some products (e.g., asset securi-
tization, trust management, and derivatives origination) enjoy
very large economies of scale. 
Interestingly, small banks have not disappeared. In fact,
many new small banks have been chartered during the con-
solidation waves of the 1980s
and 1990s. The reason the small
banks persist is that not all bank
customers need the full range of
banking products and services
provided by large-scale universal
banks. Small banks have flatter
organizational structures, imply-
ing less decision-making dis-
tance between senior manage-
ment and customers. In some
instances, the shorter distance




about the character and experi-
ence of the borrower are central
to the loan decision. If small
banks focus on particular niches
defined by types of customers
they wish to attract, they can do
so with greater agility than larg-
er universal banks, which must
be all things to all people. Tech-
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nological changes that permit Internet access and “outsourc-
ing” allow small banks to profitably perform a wide range of
functions for customers in which they serve as the customer
contact but not the ultimate executor of all aspects of the trans-
action. The availability of derivatives as hedging instruments
and the availability of software to assist small institutions in
determining their market risk exposures have also removed
some of the competitive disadvantage in managing market risk
that used to adhere to small size. 
Who benefits? It is not clear whether, on balance, regula-
tion currently favors small or large banks. Some fixed costs
associated with regulatory compliance favor large banks. On
the other hand, large banks make more attractive targets for
extortionist demands by “community groups,” particularly
when those banks seek regulatory approval for large mergers.
And the cost structure of check clearing by the Fed (which
does not charge marginal cost for its services) probably favors
small banks. Deposit insurance no longer favors large banks
now that the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine of the 1980s has been
effectively repealed as part of the 1991 fdicia legislation. A
bailout of a large bank’s uninsured depositors must now be
paid for by a special assessment on surviving banks, and thus
the costs will be borne to a large extent by surviving large
banks. (See “The New Safety Net,” Summer 2001.) The hope
of fdicia’s drafters is that this will lead surviving large banks
to lobby against such bailouts, thus eliminating any favoritism
toward “too-big-to-fail” banks.
REGULATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY
Gramm-Leach-Bliley accomplished three related objectives:
 It repealed remaining limits on bank entry into
investment banking and insurance. 
  It established a new financial holding company struc-
ture to house those activities.
 It defined the regulatory roles of the Fed, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and other financial regulators in
the regulation of financial holding companies. 
Although some observers greeted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act as an historic triumph of deregulation, it is better viewed
as a modest accomplishment. To the extent that the legislation
expanded bank powers, it was an extension and codification
of changes that had occurred more gradually over many years
before the law’s passage. And it is likely that Gramm-Leach-
Bliley will not be the last bank deregulation bill. There remain
several key issues not resolved by the act, and there is every rea-
son to believe that the continuing pressures of technological
change and competition will push the banking system further
than the drafters of Gramm-Leach-Bliley envisioned.
Six major flaws in bank regulatory structure remain:
 The lack of clarity about what financial activities are
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allowed under the new law, which creates regulatory
risk and invites politicization of the regulatory process. 
 The misguided goal under the new law of segregating
“commerce” from “finance.”
 The inappropriate reliance on the central bank as the
overarching financial regulator.
 The persistence of the view that chartered financial
institutions enjoy special rents by virtue of their charter,
and that it is appropriate for government to impose
explicit or implicit taxes on them to recover some of
those rents.
 The absence of credible market discipline alongside
supervisory discipline to prevent abuse of the govern-
ment safety net. 
 The failure to rein in quasi-public institutions that
compete with private financial institutions in housing
finance (i.e., the GSE problem).
In order for the U.S. banking industry to advance, lawmakers
and regulators must address each of those points.
Financial activities The new law allows financial activities to
be done within financial holding companies, but it does not
clearly define what a “financial activity” is. Whether banks
should be allowed to do real estate brokering, which is clearly
a financial activity by any reasonable definition, has been the
most hotly contested case thus far, as local real estate brokers
battle to prevent banks from entering their turf. If the Fed finds
that real estate brokering is not a financial activity, then banks
will be prevented from engaging in that activity. 
Such regulatory roulette results in banks facing unnecessary
risk as they plot their strategic direction in customer and prod-
uct development. What is more, it politicizes the regulatory
process. That, no doubt, helps to explain why so few non-bank
financial institutions have sought to become financial holding
companies under the rules established by Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
Commerce vs. finance The fuzzy definition of permissible
activities is the result of the government’s desire to prevent an
unfettered mixing of “finance” and “commerce.” There is no
convincing economic argument for that separation.
Too risky? One commonly proffered argument revolves
around the need to limit the range of activities that can be
financed by the insured liabilities of commercial banks, in
order to prevent abuse of the government safety net. But reg-
ulators can solve that problem (and already have solved that
problem for many years) by requiring the bank or financial
holding company to house such activities (e.g., private equi-
ty and underwriting) in separate subsidiaries. Sections 23a
and 23b of the Federal Reserve Act prevent risk transference
from subsidiaries to banks within the holding company by
limiting inter-subsidiary lending. Congress has already agreed
that the safeguards are adequate protection against risk trans-
ference to banks from non-bank financial affiliates, so there
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is no reason to believe that non-financial activities would pose
a special problem for the safety net. Indeed, there is reason to
believe the opposite. Financial activities tend to admit more
opportunity for mischief in risk-taking than non-financial
activities. And derivative transactions — which can be a
source of large, sudden, increased risk by a bank looking to
undertake risk at public expense — are often housed within
chartered banks themselves. 
Too powerful? Another argument for separating commerce
from banking revolves around concerns about the concentra-
tion of power that may result from combining banking and
credit. But in a large, highly competitive economy like that of
the United States, it is implausible to argue that permitting
Microsoft or at&t to be affiliated with a chartered commer-
cial bank would somehow make the software or telecommu-
nications markets less competitive.
Trouble for the Fed The misguided separation of finance and
commerce (and the regulatory risks and political infighting that
it invites) is especially troubling given that the designated
arbiter of the definition of “financial activity” is the central
bank. Placing the Fed in the middle of such political disputes
threatens its primary monetary policy function by politicizing
the central bank. Similarly, giving the Fed “umbrella” author-
ity to regulate financial holding companies exposes the central
bank to undesirable political pressure. The mixing of monetary
and regulatory power also creates a potential conflict of goals
within the central bank. The Fed may be tempted to forbear
from enforcing bank regulations because of countercyclical
goals that favor an expansion of credit. Recent experience from
around the world suggests that this is highly undesirable and
counterproductive behavior, but central bankers that have such
power often abuse it. 
Most developed countries have recognized the dangers of
housing regulatory authority within their central banks. In
Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy, and many other countries, the primary entities
that regulate and supervise financial intermediaries are inde-
pendent of the monetary authorities. Only in the United States
does the central bank continue to play so important a role in
financial regulation and supervision. In part, that fact reflects
the deference with which pronouncements by Alan Greenspan
were greeted on Capitol Hill during the debate over banking
reform. The Fed chairman’s successful power grab for his insti-
tution is one of the unfortunate by-products of his remarkably
successful career as a central banker.
No rents to redistribute Another shortcoming of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley was its failure, despite the efforts of Sen. Phil
Gramm (R-Texas), to adequately address problems that were
created by the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. (See
“Renovating the cra,” Summer 2001.) The act begins with the
premise that banks owe a special debt to their communities by
virtue of the privileges conferred on banks in their charters. The
cra effectively requires banks to subsidize community pro-
grams at their own expense. 
The mercantilist logic that underlies the special taxation of
chartered banks is outdated; in today’s competitive environ-
ment, bank charters no longer confer rents on their recipients.
Special taxes on banks erode their ability to compete and dis-
courage non-bank financial firms from taking advantage of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley provisions.
The safety net  Gramm-Leach-Bliley also missed the oppor-
tunity to extract the concession of credible deposit insurance
reform from the banking industry as a quid pro quo for dereg-
ulation. Because of its complexity and technical nature, pru-
dential capital regulation is little understood or discussed in the
press. But this is one of the most important areas, inside and
outside the United States, in which government policy has
failed and continues to fail. 
The current approach to capital regulation — requiring a
minimum amount of accounting equity relative to some meas-
ure of bank asset risk as the means of establishing bank stability
and proper incentives — does not work. Neither capital nor
risk is measured reliably. Experience with bank failures in the
United States over the past several years has shown that the
existing system of prompt corrective action does not prevent
many bank failures from resulting in large losses to the deposit
insurance fund. 
There is a sore need for a reformed approach that incorporates
market signals into the supervisory process and depends on mar-
ket incentives to act upon perceived weaknesses in banks. Mar-
ket discipline would incorporate market estimates of bank
default risk into prudential regulation. That would increase the
information used by examiners and, even more importantly,
make it harder for supervisors to deny obvious problems. Thus,
it would prevent distorted accounting and bureaucratic “for-
bearance” from undermining prudential regulation. 
Many advocates of reform have argued that the only cred-
ible approach to preventing abuse of the government safety net
is to incorporate market discipline into the supervisory
process. Numerous proposals to accomplish that have been
presented and debated — most notably, various plans to
require large banks to issue a minimum amount of uninsured
debt as part of their capital requirements. The proposals
received substantial backing from academics and regulators,
and even received some support from the Bankers’ Roundtable
before the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. After the act
passed, however, large banks successfully opposed a subordi-
nated debt requirement, arguing that it was unnecessary and
potentially costly.
GSEs Perhaps the final frontier of bank deregulation is the
reform of the government-sponsored enterprises (gses) that
control housing finance in the United States (Fannie Mae, Fred-
die Mac, and the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks). The gses
were formed with high public goals in mind, but it appears that
they have outlived their usefulness (if, in fact, they ever were
useful) and they create significant distortions and risk.
Mae and Mac Fannie and Freddie are out of control, both
economically and politically. The two for-profit institutions
B A N K I N G  &  F I N A N C E
enjoy special benefits, including implicit taxpayer support for
their liabilities. Critics from across the political spectrum have
chastised the two GSEs for a number of reasons, including: 
 They do not contribute significantly to Americans’
ability to own homes.
 The government guarantee of their debts wastes tax-
payers’ money ($10 billion a year) and poses a risk of
catastrophic loss to taxpayers.
 Their role as privately owned firms with public bene-
fits enables them to compete inappropriately with U.S.
Treasury securities, thus raising government borrowing
costs.
 They attempt to monopolize mortgage origination
and use that monopoly status to expand into retail
operations, which could have adverse consequences for
competition in the industry.
 They exert a poisonous influence on Congress as
powerful lobbying organizations that spend oodles of
cash to silence opponents. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be reined in through a two-
step process: immediate prudential regulation of their financial
structure and risk management, followed by full privatization. 
FHLBS The powers of the Federal Home Loan Banks
(fhlbs), which provide subsidized funding to member insti-
tutions (including thrifts, banks, and insurance companies),
were expanded under Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Now the fhlbs
provide subsidized financing of small business loans by mem-
ber institutions, in addition to subsidizing mortgage lending.
Small banks, in particular, lobbied hard for those subsidies. The
political power of the fhlbs has waxed over the past decade
as they have come to be one of the primary channels through
which banks can gain access to federal government largesse. 
Possibilities What are the prospects for rectifying the gses’
key shortcomings? There is little immediate prospect that Con-
gress will address any of the problems. But in the long run,
there is hope. 
With respect to mixing commerce and finance, clever
bankers will find ways to work around regulatory limits, and
eventually Congress probably will be led to conclude that it is
both practically impossible and highly counterproductive to
enforce such a separation. A similar process led to the elimina-
tion of the barriers between banking and finance, codified in
1999, and is likely to be repeated over the next decades.
With respect to the five other problems, congressional
action will depend on the extent to which the shortcomings
weaken U.S. banks to the point that Congress is pressed to act.
Here, the likely outcome is much less certain, and will depend
on exigencies that are hard to forecast. The likelihood of
reforming bank capital standards or privatizing the gses will
rise substantially if an embarrassing financial collapse occurs
at significant cost to taxpayers and surviving banks, just as the
prospects of removing the Fed from the regulatory process
would be heightened by a supervisory scandal.
CONCLUSION
Bank regulation does not adapt continuously to achieve the
most efficient outcome; it reacts to extreme circumstances.
Those reactions reflect unpredictable political bargains that
often introduce as many inefficient distortions as they purport
to correct.
Bank deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s went a long way
toward eliminating the many inefficiencies of the state-regu-
lated banking system of the late 1800s. But important regula-
tory impediments still exist, such as the distinction between
finance and commerce, the moral hazard created by deposit
insurance, and the special status of the gses.
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